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美国情报机构是如何低估了朝鲜的?

更新时间:2018-1-8 19:27:14 来源:纽约时报中文网 作者:佚名

How U.S. Intelligence Agencies Underestimated North Korea
美国情报机构是如何低估了朝鲜的?

WASHINGTON — At the start of Donald Trump’s presidency, U.S. intelligence agencies told the new administration that while North Korea had built the bomb, there was still ample time — upward of four years — to slow or stop its development of a missile capable of hitting a U.S. city with a nuclear warhead.

华盛顿——唐纳德·特朗普总统上台伊始,美国情报机构告诉新一届政府,尽管朝鲜已经造出了炸弹,但依然有充足的时间——四年以上——可以放慢或阻止朝鲜研制能够将核弹头投掷到美国城市的导弹。

The North’s young leader, Kim Jong Un, faced a range of troubles, they assured the new administration, giving Trump time to explore negotiations or pursue countermeasures. One official who participated in the early policy reviews said estimates suggested Kim would be unable to strike the continental United States until 2020, perhaps even 2022.

它们向新政府保证,朝鲜年轻的领导人金正恩(Kim Jong-un)面临一系列麻烦,这让特朗普有时间尝试谈判或采取对策。一位参加了早期政策评估的官员说,预估的结果显示,金正恩要到2020年甚至2022年,才具备打击美国本土的能力。

Kim tested eight intermediate-range missiles in 2016, but seven blew up on the pad or shattered in flight — which some officials attributed partly to a U.S. sabotage program accelerated by President Barack Obama. And while the North had carried out five underground atomic tests, the intelligence community estimated that it remained years away from developing a more powerful type of weapon known as a hydrogen bomb.

金正恩在2016年试射了八枚中程导弹,但七枚在发射台上爆炸或在空中解体。一些官员认为,这在一定程度上归功于贝拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)总统加快了美国的一个破坏计划。尽管朝鲜进行了五次地下核试验,但情报界估计,要研制出威力更大的氢弹,朝鲜还需数年时间。

Within months, those comforting assessments looked wildly out of date.

短短几个月的时间里,这些令人宽慰的评估就显得严重过时了。

At a speed that caught U.S. intelligence officials off guard, Kim rolled out new missile technology — based on a decades-old Soviet engine design, apparently developed in a parallel program — and in quick succession demonstrated ranges that could reach Guam, then the West Coast, then Washington.

金正恩以让美国情报官员猝不及防的速度推出了新的导弹技术——基于一种已有数十年历史的苏联发动机设计,似乎是在一个同时进行的计划中开发出来的——并接二连三地展示了能够抵达关岛,然后是西海岸,再然后是华盛顿的射程。

And on the first Sunday in September, he detonated a sixth nuclear bomb. After early hesitation among analysts, a consensus has emerged that it was the North’s first successful test of a hydrogen weapon, with explosive force some 15 times greater than the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima.

9月的第一个星期天,他引爆了第六枚核弹。在最初的疑虑过后,分析人士一致认为,这是朝鲜第一次成功的氢弹试验,其爆炸威力大约是将广岛夷为平地的那颗原子弹的15倍。

The CIA and other U.S. intelligence services had predicted this moment would come, eventually. For decades, they accurately projected the broad trajectory of North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet their inability to foresee the North’s rapid strides over the past several months now ranks among the United States’ most significant intelligence failures, current and former officials said in recent interviews.

中央情报局(CIA)和其他美国情报机构曾预言,这一刻最终会到来。几十年来,它们准确地预测了朝鲜核计划的大致轨迹。但现任和前任官员在最近接受采访时说,它们未能预见到朝鲜在过去几个月里的快速进步,这成了美国最严重的情报失误之一。

That disconnect — they saw it coming, but got the timing wrong — helps explain the confusion, mixed signals and alarm that have defined how Trump’s untested national security team has responded to the nuclear crisis.

这种脱节——他们预见到了它的到来,但却算错了时间——有助于解释特朗普未经考验的国家安全团队应对核危机时的特点:混乱、信号错综复杂和惊慌。

In an interview, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, Trump’s national security adviser, acknowledged that Kim’s race to the finish line — a bid to establish the North as a nuclear power before any negotiations begin or sanctions take a more punishing toll — “has been quicker and the timeline is a lot more compressed than most people believed.”

在一次采访中,特朗普的国家安全顾问H·R·麦克马斯特中将(H.R. McMaster)承认,金正恩冲向终点线——在任何谈判开始或制裁产生更严重的影响之间,确立朝鲜核国家的地位——的速度“加快了,进展比大部分人以为的快得多”。

As a result, he argued, “we have to do everything we are doing with a greater degree of urgency, and we have to accelerate our own efforts to resolve the issue short of conflict.”

因此,他认为,“我们必须加强对现在正在做的每一件事的紧迫感,必须加快行动,以便在不爆发冲突的情况下解决这个问题。”

Senior intelligence officials said they began investing more heavily in acquiring information on North Korea’s weapons program in 2012, reaping benefits over the past two years. But they acknowledged they made two key assumptions that proved wrong.

高级情报官员说,他们2012年开始加大对收集有关朝鲜武器计划信息的投入,并在过去两年里取得了收获。但他们承认,他们做出的两个关键假设被证明是错误的。

They assumed that North Korea would need about as much time to solve the rocket science as other nations did during the Cold War, underestimating its access to both advanced computer modeling and foreign expertise. They also misjudged Kim, 33, who took control of the dynastic regime in late 2011 and made the weapons program more of a priority than his father or grandfather did.

他们以为朝鲜解决复杂技术需要的时间,和其他国家在冷战时期需要的大致相同,低估了朝鲜利用先进的计算机建模和外国专业技术的能力。他们对现年33岁的金正恩的判断也错了。2011年年底控制朝鲜这个王朝政权后,金正恩对武器计划的重视超过了他的父亲和祖父。

Obama warned Trump during the transition a year ago that North Korea would pose the most urgent national security threat, and almost immediately the newly installed president began repeating, publicly and privately, that he inherited “a mess” in North Korea because his predecessors did not do enough.

在一年前的过渡期中,奥巴马警告特朗普说,朝鲜可能会构成最紧迫的国家安全威胁。这位新上任的总统几乎马上开始在公开场合和私底下屡屡说因为诸位前任做的不够,自己在朝鲜问题上接手了“一个烂摊子”。

Former officials in the Obama administration dispute that. But some concede that the intelligence community’s flawed assessment of the North’s progress meant there was less pressure to bolster missile defenses, more vigorously enforce sanctions or consider stepped-up covert action.

前奥巴马政府官员对此表示质疑。但一些人承认,情报界对朝鲜进展的评估错误,意味着加强导弹防御、加大制裁执行力度或考虑升级版的秘密行动的压力减少。

It is not clear that even with more advanced warning the Obama or Trump administrations would have been able to slow Kim’s progress.

不知道如果更早收到警告,奥巴马或特朗普政府是否能够放慢金正恩的进展。

And the shakiness of intelligence on North Korea — even on fundamental questions like how many nuclear weapons Kim possesses — casts a shadow over Trump’s options going forward.

有关朝鲜的情报不可靠——即便是在金正恩有多少核武器这样的基本问题上——给特朗普下一步的选择蒙上了阴影。

He has repeatedly raised the prospect of war with North Korea. He has also ordered a range of new military plans, from a limited “punch in the nose” to signal U.S. resolve to a large-scale attack aimed at destroying the country’s nuclear and missile facilities — all of which, his aides worry, could trigger a devastating wider conflict.

他多次提出与朝鲜开战的可能性,还下令重新制定了一系列军事计划,从有限的“鼻子上给一拳”到表示美国决心发起一场旨在摧毁朝鲜核设施和导弹设施的大规模袭击。他的助手担心,这些都可能引发一场更大的毁灭性冲突。

Yet many in the Pentagon see the failure to anticipate the North’s recent breakthroughs as an ominous reminder of how much could go wrong. A successful pre-emptive strike, for example, might require precise knowledge of the locations of manufacturing facilities, nuclear plants and storage areas, and confidence that cyberstrikes and electronic strikes would cripple Kim’s ability to retaliate.

但五角大楼的很多人认为,未能预见到朝鲜最近取得的突破是一个不祥的提示,表明哪些方面可能会出错。比如,先发制人的打击要想取得成功,可能需要准确地知道制造设施、核电站和存储区域的位置,并确信网络攻击和电子攻击会严重削弱金正恩的报复能力。

The past year, one senior administration official said, had been a “humbling lesson” in the limits of U.S. electronic, satellite and human intelligence operations against a sealed-off society with few computer networks, a high degree of paranoia about U.S. covert action, and a determined young leader.

一名高级政府官员称,在过去的一年里,美国在打击一个几乎没有计算机网络、对美国的秘密行动高度警惕、拥有一个坚定的年轻领导人的封闭国家时,暴露了自己在电子、卫星和人力情报行动方面的局限性,这是一个“令人羞愧的教训”。

During a talk last fall, Gen. John E. Hyten, who heads the U.S. Strategic Command, which controls the U.S. nuclear arsenal, acknowledged he had no idea when North Korea would pass its final technological hurdle: proving its warheads can survive fiery re-entry into the atmosphere to hit targets in the United States.

在去年秋季的一次谈话中,控制美国核武库的战略司令部负责人约翰·E·海腾(John E. Hyten)承认,他不知道朝鲜何时能清除最后的技术障碍:证明它的弹头能够承受重返大气层的灼热,打击美国境内的目标。

“Will they get there in 2017, 2018, 2019?” he asked rhetorically. “I see a lot of the detailed intel. I can honestly tell you, I don’t know the answer.”

“他们是会在2017年、2018年还是2019年达到那个水平?”他自问道。“我看到了很多详细的情报。我可以坦白地告诉你,我不知道答案。”

Missing Critical Turns

错过关键的转折点

Ever since the United States began tracking North Korea’s efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon, a pattern has repeated itself: U.S. intelligence agencies excelled at forecasting the direction and overall timeline of the program, yet repeatedly missed critical turns.

自美国开始追踪朝鲜制造核武器的行动以来,这是一个反复出现的情况:美国的情报机构擅于预测该计划的方向和总体时间表,但却一再遗漏它的关键转折点。

From as early as 2000, the National Intelligence Council was remarkably prescient about North Korea’s overall direction, predicting in an unclassified report that it would “most likely” have a nuclear missile that could hit U.S. cities by 2015.

早在2000年,美国国家情报委员会(National Intelligence Council)就相当准确地预测了朝鲜核计划的总体方向。它在一份非机密报告中称,到2015年,朝鲜“很可能”会拥有一枚可以打击美国城市的核导弹。

Four years later, when the United States was mired in the first year of the Iraq War, the council refined its prediction, saying a “crisis over North Korea is likely to come to a head sometime over the next 15 years,” that is, no later than 2019.

四年后,美国在陷入伊拉克战争第一年时,该委员会修正了自己的预测,称“在未来15年里,朝鲜危机可能会达到临界点”,也就是不迟于2019年。

None of this was ignored. President George W. Bush began a program to interdict ships delivering material for the North’s weapons program, and he accelerated secret efforts to cripple the program by sabotaging its supply chain with bad parts.

这些预测都没有被忽视。乔治·W·布什总统(George W. Bush)启动了一项计划,阻拦为朝鲜武器项目运送物资的船只;他还通过用不良配件破坏供应链的方式,加快了破坏朝鲜核计划的秘密行动。

But the CIA’s main focus was on counterterrorism, and satellite coverage over North Korea was often diverted to keep troops safe in the Middle East.

不过,当时CIA的工作重点是反恐,对朝鲜的卫星监视经常被转向,用于保证中东地区的部队安全。

The United States was surprised in 2006, when it received a heads-up about the North’s first underground nuclear test — from China, only about an hour before the explosion.

2006年,在朝鲜进行第一次地下核试验前一个小时,中国向美国发出了警告,这令美国感到惊讶。

It was surprised again the next year when the head of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, arrived at the White House with photographs showing a nuclear reactor under construction in Syria that matched the North’s Yongbyon reactor. One picture, eventually released by the CIA, showed the chief of North Korea’s nuclear-fuel production at the Syrian site. Though the plant was less than 100 miles from the Iraqi border, the United States had missed it.

次年,以色列情报部门摩萨德(Mossad)的负责人在白宫展示的照片显示,叙利亚在建的一座核反应堆与朝鲜宁边的反应堆相同。CIA最终公布的一幅照片显示,朝鲜核燃料生产的负责人在叙利亚的反应堆现场。尽管该地点距伊拉克边境不到100英里,但美国没有发现它。

In 2010, North Korea invited Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, to visit and showed him a complete uranium-enrichment plant it had built inside an old building at Yongbyon. The Koreans had installed the facility, at a site under regular satellite surveillance, without being detected.

2010年,朝鲜邀请前美国洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室(Los Alamos National Laboratory)主任西格弗里德·S·赫克(Siegfried S. Hecker)赴朝访问,并向他展示了在宁边一座旧建筑里修建的一座完整的铀浓缩工厂。朝鲜人在一个有常规卫星监视的地点安装了该设施,却没有被发现。

Intelligence officials said there were good reasons for this spotty record.

情报官员们称,出现这个污点是有原因的。

Foreign governments hardly ever succeed in recruiting North Korean scientists as sources because they are rarely allowed to go abroad. The North also appears to have figured out the patterns of some U.S. spy satellites.

外国政府几乎从未成功招募到朝鲜的科学家当线人,因为他们很少被允许出国。而且朝鲜似乎也摸清了美国的一些间谍卫星的规律。

And while documents released by Edward J. Snowden showed the National Security Agency had penetrated North Korea, it is unclear whether its cybersnooping gleaned anything useful in a nation with minimal computer networking.

尽管爱德华·J·斯诺登(Edward J. Snowden)公布的文件显示,美国国家安全局(National Security Agency)已经渗透到了朝鲜,但不清楚它对这个计算机网络覆盖极少的国家的网络窥探是否获得了任何有用的信息。

A Remarkable Sprint

一次惊人的冲刺

For years, North Korea devoted itself to short-range missiles that posed little threat to the United States.

多年来,朝鲜一直致力于短程导弹,对美国几乎没有构成任何威胁。

But in 2008, two years after its first nuclear test, Condoleezza Rice, then secretary of state, warned allies that the North was on the verge of another leap: A Soviet rocket engine representing “a substantial advance” had aided its development of longer-range missiles, according to a secret memo disclosed in 2010 by WikiLeaks.

但据维基解密(WikiLeaks)2010年披露的一个秘密备忘录称,2008年,也就是朝鲜首次进行核试验两年后,美国国务卿康多莉扎·赖斯(Condoleezza Rice)警告盟友,朝鲜很快会实现另一个飞跃:苏联的一个火箭引擎对朝鲜具有“实质性推动作用”,帮它开发了更远程的导弹。

Inside the Pentagon, the alarms grew louder. In early 2011, while visiting Beijing, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters North Korea was within five years of being able to fire a long-range missile. Pyongyang, he added, “is becoming a direct threat to the United States.”

在五角大楼内部,警报越来越响。2011年初,美国国防部长罗伯特·M·盖茨(Robert M. Gates)在访问北京期间对记者们说,朝鲜在五年内将具备发射远程导弹的能力。他还说,平壤“正在成为美国的直接威胁”。

Then, rather suddenly, the urgency seemed to recede.

然后,突然之间,这种紧迫感似乎消退了。

When Kim came to power, many in the intelligence community doubted he would survive: He was young, inexperienced and distrusted by his military. And over the next four years, during Obama’s second term, North Korea’s missile program experienced repeated public failures, prompting more than a few jokes on late-night television in the United States.

金正恩上台时,情报界的很多人都认为他撑不了多久,因为他年轻,没经验,也没有得到军队的信任。在之后的四年里,也就是在奥巴马的第二个任期里,朝鲜的导弹项目多次公开失败,在美国的深夜电视节目上引发了不少笑话。

By late 2013, the intelligence community had largely changed its view of Kim. He was eliminating his rivals, sometimes ordering public executions with anti-aircraft guns that shredded their bodies. And he seemed far more serious about the nuclear and missile program.

到2013年底,情报界基本上改变了对金正恩的看法。他正在清除自己的对手,有时下令进行公开处决,用高射炮粉碎他们的身体。他似乎对核武器和导弹计划更加认真。

His father and grandfather tested weapons to make a political point. Kim, however, turned the program into North Korea’s version of the Manhattan Project, the race to develop the atomic bomb in the United States. He made the development of a nuclear arsenal one of the state’s top priorities, on equal footing with economic development. Only with a nuclear deterrent, he argued, would the nation be secure enough to focus on growth.

他的父亲和祖父试验核武器,是为了表明政治立场;而金正恩把该计划变成朝鲜版的曼哈顿计划(Manhattan Project),也就是美国在原子弹开发竞赛中的行动。他把发展核武库作为国家的首要任务之一,把它置于与发展经济相同的地位。他认为,只有拥有核威慑力,他的国家才足够安全,可以集中精力发展经济。

It now appears that Kim had several missile programs underway simultaneously, and sped efforts to make parts and missile fuel indigenously, so the United States and its allies could not cut off his supplies.

现在看来,金正恩同时开展着几个导弹项目,并试图自主研制零部件和导弹燃料,这样美国及其盟友就无法切断他的供给。

Obama, increasingly concerned, ordered multiple reviews, including the one in early 2014 in which he authorized an intensification of covert cyberstrikes and electronic strikes on the North’s missile program.

愈发担忧的奥巴马批示了多个审查,其中包括2014年年初他曾授权针对朝鲜导弹计划加紧开展的秘密网络攻击和电子攻击。

The pace of missile tests accelerated, reaching a peak of more than two dozen in 2016. But at least 10 launches failed that year, including seven of an intermediate-range missile known as the Musudan.

朝鲜加快了导弹试射的步伐,在2016年以20多次的试射达到顶峰。但当年至少有10次发射失败,包括7枚被称为“舞水端”(Musudan)的中程导弹。

Former senior officials in the Obama administration say it remains unclear whether the sabotage effort contributed to the failed tests; there are many alternative explanations. But this much is clear: In October 2016, Kim ordered a halt to the Musudan tests, and the missile program rapidly shifted in a different direction, focusing on a new generation of more reliable and potent engines.

前奥巴马政府高级官员表示,目前尚不清楚试射失败是否由人为破坏力造成。除此之外还有许多说法。但清楚的一点是:2016年10月,金正恩叫停了舞水端导弹试射,同时导弹计划的走向迅速改变,转为以新一代更可靠、更强劲的发动机为重点。

In May, North Korea successfully tested the new design in an intermediate-range missile capable of hitting the U.S. territory of Guam. Then, on July 4, it stunned the world with its first successful test of an ICBM — and repeated the success a few weeks later. In November, it tested a greatly improved ICBM, known as the Hwasong-15, that could fly about 8,100 miles, far enough to threaten all of the United States.

去年5月,朝鲜成功试射了一枚能攻打至美国属地关岛的新型中程导弹;然后,朝鲜的首枚弹道导弹于7月4日试射成功,震惊世界——而在几周以后,他们又重现了这一成功;11月,朝鲜试射有了极大改良的洲际弹道导弹“火星-15”(Hwasong-15),射程达8100英里(约合13,000公里),足以威胁美国全国。

It was a remarkable sprint, and there was surprise inside the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Kim appeared to have solved the problems that plagued the Musudan — and perhaps outmaneuvered the U.S. sabotage program.

这样的短跑冲刺令人震惊,也出乎CIA和其他情报机构的意料。金正恩似乎已经解决了困扰着舞水端导弹的问题——或许也在策略上挫败了美国的破坏计划。

The latest missiles appeared to have been based on old Soviet designs. In interviews, intelligence officials said “freelancers” from the former Soviet Union — “a handful” by the estimate of one official — are almost certainly working with North Korea. The Russian government, they added, does not appear to be providing support.

最新的导弹似乎是基于苏联的旧设计制造的。情报官员在采访中表示,几乎可以肯定有前苏联的“自由职业者”在和朝鲜合作——一位官员估计有“若干人”。他们还说,俄罗斯政府看起来并未提供支持。

Between the missile tests, in September, North Korea also detonated its most powerful underground nuclear blast yet. The North claimed it was a hydrogen bomb, and after initial skepticism, many experts now say it probably was.

导弹试射期间,朝鲜还在9月引爆了迄今为止威力最大的地下核爆炸。朝鲜称这是一枚氢弹,虽然最初有所怀疑,但许多专家现在表示这应该就是氢弹。

Richard L. Garwin, a main designer of the world’s first hydrogen bomb, called the North’s hydrogen claim quite plausible given the “enormous advances” in computer modeling and “the dedication of the small group of nuclear technologists in North Korea.”

世界首枚氢弹的主设计师理查德·L·加文(Richard L. Garwin)认为,鉴于计算机建模的“巨大进步”以及“朝鲜核技术专家团队的奉献”,朝鲜氢弹的言论是十分可信的。

Several officials who served under Obama said that was a real surprise; they had been told that moment was still years away.

几名曾在奥巴马手下任职的官员也表示这确实令人意外,他们被告知这一刻还需好几年才会到来。

For several weeks, as this article was being prepared, intelligence agencies declined on-the-record comment. After it was posted online Saturday, Brian P. Hale, spokesman for the director of national intelligence, issued a statement saying that “any suggestion that we didn’t see these tests coming is dead wrong.”

在准备这篇文章的数周之内,情报机构都拒绝作出正式评论。在本文周六发布上网后,国家情报局主任的发言人布赖恩·P·黑尔(Brian P. Hale)发布的一则声明,表示“任何有关我们没有预见这些试验的说法都是大错特错的。”

“The intelligence community has always assessed that Kim Jong Un is firmly committed to developing a nuclear capability,” Hale added. “We were therefore not surprised by his accelerated pace of testing over the past few years.”

“情报界的评估一直都认为,金正恩坚定投身于核能力的发展,”黑尔补充道。“因此我们对过去几年中他的核试验进程的加快并不感到惊讶。”

He said that the North’s capabilities today “are within the projection windows” of assessments in recent years and concluded: “We have no higher intelligence priority.”

他表示,朝鲜当下的能力在近几年评估的“预期范围之内”,最后还说:“这是我们情报工作的最优先事项了。”

Forecasts and Physics

预测和物理

Entering 2018, there are several disputes inside the intelligence world about the North’s capabilities.

到了2018年,情报界内部对朝鲜的能力有几点争议。

Most intelligence agencies say the North has an arsenal of about 20 or 30 nuclear weapons, for example, but the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency puts the number above 50.

比如,大多数的情报机构都认为朝鲜拥有大约20或30件核武器,但五角大楼的国防部情报局(Defense Intelligence Agency)给出的数字在50以上。

It is more than an academic argument. If Trump attempted to destroy the arsenal, or if the North Korean government collapsed, the challenge would be to neutralize the weapons without any launch taking place or any warhead falling into the wrong hands. The more there are, the more difficult that task becomes.

这不仅仅是一个学术性争论。一旦特朗普企图摧毁核武库,或者是朝鲜政府垮台,如何在避免任何发射的情况下摧毁核武器,或是避免弹头落入图谋不轨者的手中,都将成为一个挑战。核武器越多,困难就越大。

The intelligence agencies are also intently focused on not missing the next big milestone: the moment North Korea learns how to design and build a warhead that can survive the heat and stresses of re-entry into the atmosphere, continue to plunge downward and succeed in destroying its target.

情报机构同样也聚精会神地盯着下一个重大事件:朝鲜何时能学会设计建造一个可以承受重返大气层的高温和压力,能够持续俯冲并成功击毁目标的弹头。

Having underestimated the North, though, Washington now faces some risk of overstating its capabilities and intentions, some experts hold.

但一些专家认为,虽然曾低估朝鲜,但华盛顿现在有夸大朝鲜的能力和意图的危险。

Hecker, the former director at Los Alamos, recently argued that North Korea needs “at least two more years and several more missile and nuclear tests” to perfect a weapon that can threaten U.S. cities.

洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室前主任赫克近期提出,朝鲜需要“至少再花两年,更多的导弹和核试验”才能把这个用来威胁美国国民的武器打磨完善。

There is still time “to start a dialogue,” he said, “in an effort to reduce current tensions and head off misunderstandings that could lead to war.”

目前还来得及“开展对话,以求缓解目前的紧张形势,防止会导致战争的误解出现,”他说。

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